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Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010048-7

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2 May 1966

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OCI No. 1197/66  
Copy No. 41

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

WEEKLY REPORT

PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY

FOR THE

SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

State Dept. review completed

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**SECRET**

25X1

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
1. Indonesia - Communist China. . . . .	1
2. Cambodia-Thailand. . . . . . . . .	2
3. [Redacted]	
4. Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	4
5. [Redacted]	

25X6

25X6

2 May 1966

**SECRET**

25X1

**SECRET**

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25X1

1. INDONESIA - COMMUNIST CHINA

The new Indonesian regime appears to be deliberately pushing relations with Peking to the breaking point.

Djakarta's current anti-Peking orientation, superimposed on the traditional Indonesian dislike of the local Chinese, is generating the highest level of anti-Chinese demonstrations and seizures of Chinese property since independence. Most of this activity is being carried out by anti-Communist, Moslem groups, who in many instances appear to receive support from local military authorities.

Local police made no attempt to stop the recent sacking of the Chinese embassy and consular offices in Djakarta. Stringent restrictions and lack of protection by Indonesian authorities have forced Chinese Communist consulates in Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes to cease operation.

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Djakarta apparently still hopes that the Chinese can be provoked into severing ties.

Peking, however, has never taken the lead in breaking relations with a foreign country. It still maintains low-level diplomatic ties with India and Yugoslavia, and appears determined to hang on in Indonesia. Here, in particular, it would be anxious to avoid initiating a break which would give the appearance of abandoning the Overseas Chinese. Peking insists that the exodus of Chinese diplomatic and technical personnel which has been under way for some time is only "temporary" and that the Chinese ambassador has merely been recalled for "consultations."

Barring a formal rupture, it seems probable that each side will reduce its official representation to a skeleton diplomatic staff in the other's capital. A period of "non-relations" is likely to follow, characterized by a continuing and probably intensifying propaganda exchange.

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
2 May 1966

-1-

**SECRET**

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25X1

## 2. CAMBODIA-THAILAND

Tension is increasing along the 400-mile Thai-Cambodia border as both countries move up reinforcements in reaction to recent skirmishes.

The current round of border disturbances was precipitated late last year when anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei dissidents launched a series of sharp attacks against isolated Cambodian outposts. Saigon and Bangkok view these attacks as the beginning of a campaign to establish a Khmer Serei foothold on Cambodian territory. They have also reinforced Sihanouk's darkest suspicions concerning the territorial ambitions of his neighbors.

Although the fighting has involved only a small number of troops in isolated areas thus far, more serious incidents may be in the offing. Cambodia has deployed several newly formed battalions to sensitive areas. These forces are being equipped with Chinese-supplied artillery and antiaircraft weapons and are under orders to react sharply to any provocation. Sihanouk has also been talking of retaliatory raids into Thailand. So far, the Thais have acted more cautiously in strengthening their border forces.

As long as Bangkok continues to show restraint, the border situation will probably not get out of hand militarily. Its political impact is likely to be more lasting, however. Sihanouk's recent statements concerning a closer political accommodation with the Communists were accompanied by bitter references to Cambodian lives lost fighting the Thais and their Khmer Serei "lackeys." He has thus demonstrated once again how his sense of isolation and his dependence on his Communist "friends" are increased by developments on the Thai border.

25X1

2 May 1966

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25X6

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**SECRET**

25X1

4. TANZANIA

Frictions are increasing in Tanzania's relations with the US as a result of efforts by pro-Communist, Zanzibari leaders to dispossess the US Consulate on the island.

The extremists have spread rumors that the US is backing the former Arab sultan in a counterrevolutionary plot, have produced "confessions" implicating US personnel, and now appear to have convinced Tanzanian Vice President Karume, who heads the local government, that the US consul is involved. Last month (April) their pressure caused the closing of the USIS library and the removal of the US public affairs officer. Similar methods forced the ouster of three US diplomats from Tanzania last year.

Despite two years of formal union with the mainland the Zanzibaris have retained their independent authority. Their dealings with foreign countries have often embarrassed President Nyerere. Thus Zanzibar's decision to expel the USIS officer was leaked to the press and Nyerere was faced with an accomplished fact. He decided not to overrule Karume lest the tenuous bonds of union be further strained.

The extremists' continual exposure of "Arab plots" and "US intrigues" serves several objectives: (1) to eliminate US influence from the island; (2) to exacerbate Nyerere's relations with the US; (3) to keep the suspicious, Arab-hating Karume off balance and under extremist influence; and (4) to frustrate Nyerere's efforts to consolidate the union.

Nyerere apparently does not want the consulate removed and will try to end the harassments. On 28 April he expressed to the US ambassador his appreciation for Washington's patience in the face of recent provocations. His good intentions, however, will face a continuing challenge by Zanzibar's extremists.

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